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RECENT DECISIONS
Andriolo: Rogers v. Richmond

IN

DETERMINING WIIEThIER A CONFESS!ON WAS VOLUNTARY AND THERE-

FORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE USE OF A STANDARD THAT TAKES INTO
ACCOUNT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF PROBABLE TRUTH

OR FALSITY

VIOLATES

THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-Petitioner

was arrested on charges of committing attempted robbery and other crimes.
Thereafter he was transported without court order from jail to the office of
the State's Attorney where he was questioned throughout the afternoon and
evening about a murder. Petitioner confessed to the murder when informed that his wife was to be taken into custody. The test applied by the
trial court to determine the voluntariness of the confession was whether the
conduct of the states' law enforcement officials had been such as to induce
the petitioner to confess falsely that he had committed the crime. The confession was held to have been voluntary. On appeal the Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut applied the same test and held that the confession
was true and hence voluntary. Petitioner then sought a federal writ of
habeas corpus, on the principle ground that since the confession was secured
under circumstances rendering it constitutionally inadmissible, he was
denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut held that the confession was involuntary and set aside the conviction. On appeal the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the District Court's
judgment on procedural grounds. The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. On remand the District Court dismissed the writ. The judgmnent was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. On certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed. The Connecticut trial
court in admitting the confession as voluntary, and the Supreme Court of
Errors in affirming the conviction, failed to apply the standard demanded
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for determining
the admissibility of a confession. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961)
(Mr. Justice Stewart, with whom Mr. Justice Clark joined, dissenting).'
The Court pointed out that its decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment have made it clear that convictions following the admission into evidence of involuntary confessions, i.e., confessions which are the product of
coercion, either physical or psychological, cannot stand.! And then it stated:
This is so not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but
because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying
principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an
accusatorialand not an inquisitorialsystem-a system in which the
State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely
'The dissenting judge agreed with the majority of the court in holding that any

consideration of the element of reliability was constitutionally precluded in determining whether or not a confession was voluntary. But they felt that the petitioner
was not entitled to relief by way of a federal writ of habeas corpus merely because
the state failed to apply the proper test of admissibility. They felt that the writ
could only be granted if the petitioner was in fact in custody in violation of the
Constitution and laws of the United States. In their judgment the case should
have been remanded to the District Court which by appling the proper test could
determine whether the confession was involuntary and the petitioner was being held
in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States. The issuance of the
Instant case at 549.
2writ would depend on the trial court's decision on this issue.
Instant case at 540.
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secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth.' (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, even if a confession is clearly reliable, it is inadmissible if the will of
the defendant has been overcome and his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired.' Consideration of the element of reliability is constitutionally precluded because it cannot be determined what weight the trial
judge placed on that element.' If the confession is clearly reliable, the
judge may interpret, construe, and relate facts in such a manner as to emphasize those facts which tend to show that the confession was voluntary
and de-emphasize those facts which tend to show that the confession was
involuntary. But if he feels that the confession is unreliable his emphasis
may be just the opposite.
The test which the Supreme Court of the United States holds should
be applied to determine whether a confession is voluntary is:
[W]hether the behavior of the State's law enforcement officials
was such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring about
confessions not freely self-determined-a question to be answered
with complete disregard of whether or not petitioner in fact spoke
the truth.'
The Connecticut courts applied the following test: Were the circumstances under which the statement of the defendant was given such as to
procure an untrue, hence involuntary, statement ?' This test would sanction all methods of procuring confessions by allowing the admission into
evidence of all "true" confessions, no matter how obtained.
The test required by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
instant case and the one applied by the Connecticut courts are diametrically
opposed-the latter requires complete reliance on truth while the former
forbids any reliance on truth. But it must be noted that the Supreme Court
of the United States found evidence of psychological coercion' whereas the
trial court found only the employment of artifice or deception.! It has long
been recognized that the use of artifice, trickery, or fraud, however reprehensible, in inducing a confession will not alone render the confession inadmissible.' ° Such confessions are basically different from those induced
by duress or promise, "for when one is tricked into making an incriminating statement there is no temptation to admit falsehoods in order to ward
off a threatened danger or to obtain a promised reward.' "" These basically
"Id. at 540-41.

'Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961). "The line of distinction is that at
which governing self-direction is lost and compulsion, of whatever nature or however infused, propels or helps to propel the confession." 367 U.S. at 602.
'Instant case at 545.

'Id.at 544.
'State v. Rogers, 143 Conn. 167, 120 A.2d 409 (1956).
"The court does not specify this, but a reading of the opinion clearly shows
that this is what they are holding.
'The Connecticut trial judge instructed the jury, inter alia, that: "The fact that a
confession was procured by the employment of some artifice or deception does not
exclude the confession if . . . the artifice or deception was not calculated to procure
an untrue statement." Instant case at 542.
120 Am. Jur. Evidence § 519 (1939) ; 3 Wigmore Evidence § 841 (3rd ed. 1940).
"20 Am. Jur. Evidence § 519 (1939).
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different findings could very well have been the reason for the two different tests. In fact the Supreme Court of the United States stresses that
in the instant case it does not deal with a factual situation where, taking
all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there is
still no evidence of coercion."2 Therefore, the decision in the instant case
does not preclude consideration of the element of reliability in determining
whether a confession obtained by only trick, artifice, or fraud is admissible
in evidence because in such a case there is no coercion.'
Although the distinction between trick and coercion was recognized by
the trial court," the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut did not disThe Montana Supreme Court has also failed to make this distinccuss it.'
tion between trick and coercion and has applied a test taking into consideration the element of reliability in both situations.

The Montana courts, in determining whether a confession is voluntary,
apply the following test: "Was the inducement held out to the accused
such as that there is any fair risk of a false confesgion?""(Emphasis supThis test is somewhere between the test applied by the Connecticut
plied.)
courts and the one required by the United States Supreme Court. In the
Montana test, the reliably element is important, but not controlling. Holding hat a confession is involuntary if there is a fair risk of a false confession is far different from holding that the confession is involuntary if untrue.
In State v. Dixson," the defendant confessed after officers told him
that "if a person told the truth, as a rule, he got out of it a whole lot easier
than he would by telling a lot of lies. "" The court held that such statements
did not render the confession involuntary. The worst that such statements
could invoke is the truth and therefore, there is no fair risk of a false confession. " The mere fact that an inducement has been held out does not
render the confession inadmissible; the inducement must be such that there
'
The court then stated: "Everything
is a fair risk of a false confession.
In State
in the case indicates that the defendant's confessions were true.'"
'Instant case at 548, n.5.
'If coercion of any form is connected with the trick or fraud, we must apply the
rules as to coerced confessions.
"Note 9, 8upra.
"State v. Rogers, 143 Conn. 167, 120 A.2d 409 (1956).
"State v. Sherman, 35 Mont. 512, 522, 90 Pac. 981, 983 (1907) ; State v. Rossell, 113
Mont. 457, 465, 127 P.2d 379, 382 (1942) ; State v. Roebuck, 126 Mont. 302, 309, 248
P.2d 817, 820 (1952) ; State v. Dixson, 80 Mont. 181, 198, 260 Pac. 138, 144 (1927) ;
State v. Hoffman, 94 Mont. 573, 582, 23 P.2d 972, 974 (1933) ; State v. Nelson, 362
P.2d 224, 230 (Mont. 1961).
"[T]he object of the rule is not to exclude a confession of the truth, but to
avoid the possibility of a confession of guilt from one who is in fact innocent."
State v. Sherman, 35 Mont. at 522, 90 Pac. 983. The Sherman case recognized,
however, that in certain cases even a confqssion of the truth must be excluded:
. . . if the circumstances are such as that the prospect of bettering his situation by speaking even falsely would appeal to the confussing party as a reasonable person., as the better alternative to remaining quiet, then the confession
ought not to be received." Id. at 520, 90 Pac. at 983.
'80 Mont. 181, 260 Pac. 138 (1927).
14Id. at 197, 260 Pac. at 144.
"This is a paraphrase of a quotation from 2 WIGMORE Evidence § 832 (2nd ed. 1923)
which was quoted by the court. State v. Dixson, 80 Mont. 181, 199, 260 Pac. 138,
145 (1927).
'Note 17, supra.
"80 Mont. at 201, 260 Pac. at 146.
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v. Rossell,' the defendant, who was convicted of grand larceny for the theft
of a cow, confessed after officers informed him that there was no bill of
sale for the cow that he had sold. This statement was untrue. Defendant
contended that the statement had led him to believe that his principal
defense (claim of ownership) was lost, and that the statement had thereby
tricked him into giving an involuntary confession. The court applied the
Montana test and held that the tiial court did not err in admitting the
confession, especially in view of the fact that the evidence produced by
the state was consistent with the statements made by the defendant. Thus,
although in both cases it appears that the confessions were voluntary even
under the rule laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in
the instant case, there can be little doubt that the court relied on the reliability of the confessions in determining that the conduct of the law enforcement officials was not such as to cause a fair risk of a false confession.'
In State v. Nelson,' a case of special interest, the defendant confessed
to the crime of murder, but later contended that the confessions were involuntary because the sheriff had forcefully suggested some of the words
contained in the confession. Defendant further contended that he was
deprived of the counsel of friends and family in such a manner as to render
his confession involuntary. The court held that the confessions were voluntary and admitted them. It is evident that some coercion was present.
While there may not have been such coercion as to result in any fair risk
of a false confession, the conduct of the law enforcement officials might
have been such as to overbear the defendant's will to resist and bring about
a confession not freely self-determined.
Two Montana cases at first glance appear to change the Montana test.
In State v. Crighton,' which was followed in State v. Duran," the court
quoted the following passage from 16 C.J. 717 :'
A confession of guilt by an accused is admissible against him when
and only when, it was freely and voluntary made without having
been induced by the expectation of any promised benefit nor by the
fear of any threatened injury.
This test is not objectionable under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But it is doubtful that the court intended to depart
from he test stated in its earlier cases. In the Crighton case the court referred to State v. Dixson' and State v. Hoffman,' both of which follow the
Montana test, when stating that a confession must be shown to have been
voluntary before it is admissible, and then it quoted the rule set out above
as being an excellent summary of the authorities on the subject that a con1113 Mont. 457, 127 P.2d 379 (1942).
3In State v. Roebuck, 126 Mont. 302, 248 P.2d 817 (1952), the defendant confessed
after her accomplice, who had already confessed, was induced by officers to attempt
to induce the defendant to confess. Defendant's accomplice told her to sign the
confession and that it would probably go a lot easier on her if she did. The court
held that there was no such inducement as might result in a false confession.
362 P. 2d. 224 (Mont. 1961).
297 Mont. 387. 34 P.2d 1951 (1953).
"127 Mont. 233, 259 P.2d 1951 (1953).

'A misprint in the official Montana Reports cites 15 C.J. instead of 16 C.J.
zNote 17, 8upra.
"'4Mont. 573, 23 P.2d 972 (1933).
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fession must be voluntary to be admissible. Thus, the court did not intend
to establish a new test for determining whether a confession was voluntary,
but was merely summarizing the authorities that hold that a confession
must be voluntary to be admissible. The confession in the Crighton case
was held inadmissible on the ground that the state had not laid a foundation as to the voluntariness of the confession.
However, the court in the Duran case held that a confession was inadmissible by applying the rule stated in the passage which the court had
quoted from Corpus Juris in the Crighton case. Thus although the court
in the Crighton case did not intend this passage to be used as a test to
determine whether a confession was voluntary, it became such a test in the
Duran case. But in the period between the Crighton and Duran cases the
court had applied the Montana test and in the cases following the Duran
case the court has continued to apply the Montana test.
The Montana supreme court, in all. of the preceding cases except the
Rossel case, was dealing with coercion. Yet in all of these cases, with the
possible exception of the Duran case, the court applied a test which had as
one of its fundamental elements the consideration of the reliability of the
confession. The court never discussed the distinction between trick and
coercion. But the court cannot be criticized for failing to make this distinction because until the decision in the instant case there was no need
to make such a distinction. The Montana test was well suited to either
situation when the consideration of the element of reliability was not precluded.
The present Montana test to be used in determining whether a confession is voluntary where there is coercion present violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the test does not say
that a confession is voluntary if true, as did the Connecticut test as applied
to coerced confessions by the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, it
does place emphasis on the reliability of the confession in determining
whether there is any fair risk of a false confession. Such emphasis is not
permissible inasmuch as it is impossible to determine to what extent the consideration of the reliability element has influenced the judge in determining what constitutes a fair risk of a false confession.
Allowing consideration of the reliability of a confession which is obtained by trick or fraud is largely of only academic value because from
the very definition of what constitutes a confession obtained by trick or
fraud there can be no temptation to admit a falsehood and such a confession would readily be admissible under the test laid down by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the instant case. If there is coercion
connected with the trick then the test of the instant case would have to be
applied.
RICHARD J. ANDRIOLO
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